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Abstract: 
In this study, thermal-hydraulic parameters inside the containment of WWER-
1000/v446 nuclear power plant are simulated in a Double Ended Cold Leg (DECL) accident 
for short and long times (by using CONTAIN 2.0 and MELCOR 1.8.6 codes) and the effect of 
the spray system as an Engineering Safety Feature (ESF) on parameters mitigation are analyzed 
with the former code. Along with the development of the accident from Design Basis Accident 
(DBA) to Beyond Design Basis Accident (BDBA), the zircaloy-steam reaction becomes the 
source of in-vessel hydrogen generation. Hydrogen distribution inside the containment is 
simulated for long time (using CONTAIN and MELCOR) and the effect of recombiners on its 
mitigation are analyzed (using MELCOR). Thermal-hydraulic parameters and hydrogen 
distribution profiles are presented as the outcome of the investigation. By activating the spray 
system, the peak points of pressure and temperature occur in the short time and remain below 
the maximum design values along the accident time. It is also shown that recombiners have a 
reliable effect on reducing the hydrogen concentration below flame-propagation limit in the 
accident localization area. The parameters predicted by CONTAIN and MELCOR are in good 
agreement with the Final Safety Analysis Report. The noted discrepancies are discussed and 
explained.  
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1. Introduction 
 The analysis of the nuclear power plant is performed to justify and substantiate the nuclear 
safety of the plant in case of design disturbances due to malfunction or failure of equipment 
[1]. To protect people and the environment from the consequences of an accident, several 
sequential physical constraints for the confinement of radioactive materials are put in place. 
Their specific design may vary depending on the activity of the material and on the possible 
deflections from a normal operation that could lead up to loss of some barriers. Those confining 
the fission products are typically fuel matrix, fuel cladding, the boundary of the reactor coolant 
system and, finally, the containment system. 
A specific type of Large Break Loss Of Coolant Accident (LB-LOCA) is DECL (Double Ended 
Cold Leg) that corresponds to a total guillotine type of break in cold leg pipe and is one of the 
most hazardous design basis accident in the reactor containment [2]. The progression of this 
accident without the interference of engineering safety features can lead to the release of water 
and steam mass and energy into the containment (Design Basis Accident - DBA), in-vessel 
hydrogen generation (Beyond Design Basis Accident - BDBA), core melting and ex-vessel 
hydrogen generation (Severe Accident - SA) and finally hydrogen explosion and loss of 
containment integrity. 
Hydrogen can be generated by different sources inside the containment. In the early phase, it 
can be generated as a result of hot fuel clad (zircaloy) reaction with steam while in the late-
phase generation, it will be the product of molten core material mixture (Corium) reaction with 
the concrete structure of containment [3]. 
In the case of hydrogen generation (in-vessel or ex-vessel), prediction of hydrogen distribution 
(concentration map of hydrogen) in different locations (rooms) of reactor containment can help 
the designer to modify the safety features and find the best location for their installation to 
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avoid the hydrogen combustion or explosion. The concentration distribution of hydrogen also 
needs to be assessed to ensure that, due to the hydrogen concentration distribution in the 
containment, sustained deflagration or detonation, for which the containment is not designed, 
should not occur. According to the Code of Federal Regulations, title 10 (CFR 10), by Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) of the United States, each Safety Analysis Report (SAR) 
should provide a system for hydrogen control that can safely accommodate hydrogen generated 
by the equivalent of a 100% fuel-clad metal water reaction [4]. 
Given the importance of these, several studies were conducted in recent years to evaluate the 
thermal-hydraulic behavior of the containment in an accident like LB-LOCA and hydrogen 
distribution as its consequences; a better understanding of thermal-hydraulic parameters of LB-
LOCA can provide the initial conditions for hydrogen distribution simulation.  
In some of these studies, containment parameters due to LB-LOCA were simulated by using 
different tools and models. Noori-kalkhoran et al. have applied different tools for the simulation 
of thermal-hydraulic parameters of containment due to DECL: CONTAIN code, Single-cell, 
and Multi-cell models [5,6]. The GOTHIC code has been used widely to simulate the 
parameters in IRIS [7], ABWR [8], BWR Mark III [9] and PWR [10] containments. This code 
is a general purpose thermal-hydraulic tool that can be used to model multi-component and 
multi-phase flow systems in multi-dimensional geometries. This code is suitable for safety 
analysis of nuclear power plant containment buildings [11]. Recently, an interesting study by 
Povilaitis et al. [12] about the uncertainty and sensitivity analysis for a generic containment 
severe accident has demonstrated that both user effects and input uncertainties play a similar 
role. In the review by De Boeck [13], the author has described the main threats to the 
containment integrity and the state of knowledge and remaining uncertainties. From another 
point of view, some studies have dealt with the effects of ESFs on mitigation of LOCA 
consequence inside the containment. Numerical investigations of the response of the passive 
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containment cooling system and containment under a DELB (Double Ended Leg Break) LOCA 
were performed by Yu et al. [14]. Effects of spray on the performance of the hydrogen 
mitigation system during LB-LOCA was studied by Huang et al. in CPR1000 NPP [15]. Guk 
et al. reported on the thermal-hydraulic evaluation of passive containment cooling system of 
improved APR+ during LOCAs [16].  
Hydrogen generation and distribution inside NPP containment due to LOCA have also been 
studied by different authors for different reactor types such as PWR [17]. In recent years, use 
of CFD codes has increased for the analysis of the hydrogen behavior within NPP 
containments. Ravva et al. [18] have developed a sump model for containment hydrogen 
distribution by using CFD models. Martin-Valdepenas et al. improved a CFD code for the 
analysis of hydrogen behavior within containment [19]. A CFD analysis of hydrogen 
volumetric concentration in a Mark II BWR containment system was studied by Miguel 
Gomez-Torres et al. [20]. Besides CFD methods, some other methods and codes have been 
employed for simulation of hydrogen distribution in the containment. Cascade fuzzy neural 
networks were selected by Choi et al. for prediction of hydrogen concentration in NPP 
containment [21]. Szabo et al. coupled MELCOR and GASFLOW to obtain the hydrogen 
distribution in the containment [22]. They designed an interface to receive the source term from 
MELCOR and send back the containment pressure during run time. This coupling was used to 
postulate LOCA in a generic PWR. Different methods and tools to mitigate the hydrogen 
concentration inside containment in accident situation were also analyzed. Breitung et al. 
developed a systematic step-by-step procedure for the deterministic analysis of hydrogen 
behavior and mitigation in severe accidents [23], while a generic approach for designing and 
implementing a Passive Autocatalytic Recombiner (PAR) was proposed by Bachellerie et al. 
[24] under the project “PARSOAR”. 
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Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP)-WWER-1000/v446- is the only representative of this 
version built around the world. Its special containment design (spherical steel inner layer with 
outer cylindrical concrete one) yields unique features such as geometry, specification and 
behavior in different containment accidents. In this study, first, thermal-hydraulic parameters 
of WWER-1000/v446 containment are simulated in short and long time by using CONTAIN 
and MELCOR codes and results are compared with BNPP FSAR (ANGAR code) to 
benchmark the simulation. Next, the effect of spray as an ESF is studied in the mitigation of 
containment pressure and temperature by using CONTAIN code. It is assumed that accident 
will develop from DBA to BDBA and in-vessel hydrogen generation will occur (this 
assumption is based on LB-LOCA with Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) active part 
failure due to NPP black out). Finally, hydrogen distribution is predicted by both codes and the 
effects of recombiners on hydrogen mitigation is studied by using MELCOR. Thermal-
hydraulic and hydrogen distribution map of containment is also presented in the last second of 
the accident (about 105 seconds) in the absence of ESFs. Reasons for discrepancies between 
MELCOR and CONTAIN codes results are presented and explained.  
2. BNPP containment 
Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) is a Russian type pressurized water reactor (WWER). 
Its electrical capacity is 1000 MW with 3000 Mw thermal capacity.  It has a dual-layer 
cylindrical containment. The inner steel containment that has an average thickness of 30 mm 
with 56 m diameter and contains the main systems, such as core, primary loop components, 
Steam Generators (SGs) and safety features. The outer containment is a concrete construction 
with a density of 2.35 g/cm3. Its upper side has a thickness of about 1750 mm whereas the 
lower side is about 2000 mm thick. There is a 1650 mm gap between the inner and outer layer 
[25].  
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The containment was designed based on withstanding against i) simultaneous occurrence of 
maximum peak pressure in the postulated DECL accident and station black out (that leads to 
ECCS active part failure) as internal worst-case accident and ii) airplane crash as an external 
worst-case accident (crash of Boeing-747 on containment building) [25]. Figure 1 shows the 
containment structure whereas the main specifications and design parameters are listed in 
Tables 1 and 2, respectively.   
Table 1. BNPP containment specifications 
 
 
 
Table 2. Design parameters for BNPP 
 
Parameter value 
Maximum internal pressure at 150 oC (MPa) 0.46 
Maximum pneumatic test pressure at a temperature of up to 60 oC (MPa) 0.51 
Maximum (averaged over the volume) temperature (oC) 150 
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Figure 1. BNPP containment structure 
3. Hydrogen in NPP containment 
Following LOCA, hydrogen gas may accumulate within the containment from various sources. 
If a sufficient amount of hydrogen is generated, it may react with oxygen present in the 
containment vessel atmosphere at rates rapid enough to lead to high temperatures and 
significant over pressurization of containment. The hydrogen concentration monitoring and 
emergency removal system is designed to control the concentration of hydrogen that may be 
released within the containment atmosphere following a LOCA.  
3.1. Hydrogen generation 
Hydrogen may get generated because of the following three mechanisms depending on the 
accident progression [3,26]: 
• Oxidation of zircaloy cladding material that is in the early phase of the accident (in-
vessel generation)  
9 
 
• oxidation of metallic materials (More Zr and Cr) by the reaction of corium with 
concrete containment in the late phase of the accident (ex-vessel generation) 
• oxidation of metallic materials in Direct Containment Heating phenomena (DCH). 
3.1.1. In-vessel hydrogen generation 
The main source of the in-vessel hydrogen generation is as result of Zircaloy and steam reaction 
(Oxidation of fuel clad) but depends on the type of reactor can also be as result of steel and 
Boron carbide (B4C- absorbing material) oxidation.  It is generally observed that about 10% to 
15% of the total in-vessel hydrogen generation is due to steel oxidation [3]. 
3.1.2. Ex-vessel hydrogen generation 
In the first hours of Molten Core Concrete Interaction (MCCI), zirconium and chromium 
masses are oxidized by steam thus producing H2 and CO; after that, Fe is oxidized for about a 
day until the penetration is completed [27]. 
In the initial hours of the accident or even less, almost all the masses of zirconium and 
chromium will be oxidized as result of the molten core-concert interaction. During the core-
concrete interaction, CO can be released depending on the composition of the basement 
concrete. So, the results are highly depended to plants specifications.  The so-called ‘flammable 
mixture’ (H2+CO) in the containment must take into account in the risk evaluation due to 
hydrogen burning. Table 3 lists the hydrogen formation by different sources due to LOCA in 
BNPP. The profiles of hydrogen generation are shown in Figure 2. 
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Table 3. Hydrogen formation from different sources due to LOCA in BNPP [25] 
 
 
Figure 2. Hydrogen generation profile 
 
3.2. Hydrogen distribution and combustion 
 
 Hydrogen distribution can be influenced significantly by some of the parameters such as 
containment layout, the location of hydrogen source, containment thermal-hydraulic conditions 
and rate of hydrogen release.  Hydrogen can be released into the containment or reactor 
building through pathways and breaks of the Reactor Cooling System (RCS).   
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Some of the engineering safety features like the spray system can also affect the distribution of 
hydrogen in containment. Spray systems are used in many NPPs to reduce the containment 
pressure, condense the steam, decrease the temperature and mitigation of hydrogen 
concentration. Spray system can decrease the risk of hydrogen accumulation and local 
detonations [25]. 
3.3. Hydrogen control and risk mitigation 
Different methods and tools are using to control and mitigate the hydrogen concentration inside 
the containment, these are: 
• pre-inertization by using some inert gas like Nitrogen  
• mitigation by using Engineering Safety Features (ESFs) like spray, Passive 
Autocatalytic Hydrogen Recombiners (PARs) and igniters 
One of the main advantages of passive autocatalytic hydrogen recombiners is that these safety 
features don’t need to power source and actuation of the operator for their operation. The key 
point is to install these PARs in appropriate locations inside the containment to have more 
efficiency and coverage. Installation coordinates of PARs and their numbers are affected by 
the amount and distribution of hydrogen inside the containment, so analyzing the hydrogen 
distribution inside the containment can help to modify the using of these features. 
4. Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA) and its consequences 
DECL (Double Ended Cold Leg) is a specific type of LOCA with a complete break of cold leg 
pipe. It is one of the worst-case accidents in NPPs where the primary coolant is released to the 
containment leading to an increase of both pressure and temperature inside the containment. In 
addition, the amount of coolant in the core will reduce and the core temperatures increase in a 
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manner that may conduct to the melting of the reactor core. There are three main stages to the 
time of the fuel rod failure as the LOCA accident progresses: 
• Core uncover; the reactor level decreases because of loss of coolant through a break. 
The coolant inventory can leak very fast and the reactor pressure vessel depressurizes 
accordingly. 
• Core boil-off; if the initial transient doesn’t lead to blow down, the liquid level 
gradually drops as the decay heat vaporizes the water above and in the core. 
• Core heat up; once the core is uncovered, fuel rods will heat up at a high rate. When the 
clad temperature reaches its melting point, cladding failure is assumed. As the 
temperature continues to rise, it will be reaching the temperature at which 
zircaloy/steam reaction produces hydrogen and more heat. 
Table 4 shows the sequence of events when a LB-LOCA occurs in NPP. 
Table 4. Events layout in  LB-LOCA 
Event Time(sec) 
Large break in the cold leg 0 
Reactor scram 2 
Start of accumulator 5 
End of accumulator feed 65 
Failure of cladding (cladding exceeds the temperature of 1,173 K) 620 
Molten corium starts to form the molten pool 2,230 
Dry core (no water in the active core) 2,790 
Start of melt material slump in the lower head of the vessel 3,670 
Pressure vessel failure 5,100 
 
5. Simulations  
5.1. CONTAIN simulation code 
The CONTAIN 2.0 computer code is an integrated analysis tool to predict the physical 
condition, chemical composition and distribution of radiological materials inside a containment 
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building following the release of material from primary system in a light water reactor accident 
[28].  Some of the CONTAIN models have been used in this simulation; inter-cell flow model, 
heat transfer structure model (walls, roofs, floors), lower cell model and engineering system 
model (spray, recombiner, heat exchanger). 
5.2. MELCOR simulation code 
MELCOR is a fully integrated computer code that can be used to simulate various phenomena 
in the progression of severe accidents inside the containment. These accidents that can be 
simulated by MELCOR are reactor coolant system thermal-hydraulic behavior in the case of 
accidents, reactor building and its cavity, containment and its relevant buildings and various 
process in the case of severe accidents. Different packages of MELCOR code have been used 
in this study such as control volume hydrodynamics, flow path, heat structures, containment 
spray and passive autocatalytic hydrogen recombiners [29].  
5.3. Simulation procedure 
Simulation of hydrogen distribution is conducted into two separate steps by using both 
CONTAIN 2.0 and MELCOR 1.8.6 to ensure validation of code inputs, geometry, and 
structure: 
1. simulation of containment pressurization due to LOCA and analysis of the effectiveness of 
the spray system on thermal-hydraulic parameters of containment; 
2. simulation of hydrogen distribution due to in-vessel hydrogen generation and effects of 
recombiners on its mitigation. 
The total volume of Bushehr NPP containment is divided into 23 cells (control volumes in 
MELCOR). Each cell represents one or some connecting rooms and includes compartments of 
Bushehr NPP. The division of containment into these cells is considered according to the 
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coordinate, included compartment and also their safety priority. Table 5 introduces the relevant 
specifications. Cells are connected together with 33 engineering vents (flowpath in MELCOR). 
Six of these are defined as valves in codes that are closed until the differential pressure between 
respective cells reaches 0.01 MPa [25]. Cells layout diagram and connections are shown in 
Figure  3. 
Table 5. Specification of containment cells 
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Figure 3. Cells layout diagram and connections 
A set of 137 heat structures are also considered in the simulations, each characterized by its 
position, geometry, and type of structural material. 
5.3.1. Spray system 
The main purpose of the spray system as Engineering Safety Feature (ESF) is to reduce the 
temperature and pressure inside the containment in the case of accidents. If any accidents 
happen that lead to the release of water, steam or their mixture to the containment atmospheres, 
automatic actuation of spray system can reduce the temperature, pressure and concentration of 
radioactive isotopes by condensation on spray droplets and wash out the radioactive materials. 
The setpoint of actuation for BNPP’s spray system is 0.03 MPa gauge [25]. When the pressure 
inside the containment reduces to less than 0.02 MPa (gauge), the spray system is disabled. 
The spray circuit is composed of pumps, valves, tanks, heat exchanger and nozzles that spray 
the coolant into the primary containment structure. Figure 4 shows the spray cycle in BNPP. 
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Figure 4. Spray cycle in BNPP 
The spray system reduces the pressure and temperature inside the steel containment by 
injection of boric acid with concentration of 16 g boric acid (H3BO3) per 1 kg water (H2O) and 
iodine-binding reagents. The temperature of this solution is in the range of 20-60 oC (depending 
to the situation) and its mass flow rate is 300 ton/hr. I. Table 6 lists the characterization of spray 
nozzles in BNPP spray system. Some of the characteristics of the spray nozzles are listed in 
Table 6. 
Table 6. Characteristics of the spray nozzles 
Characteristics Value 
Materials sprayed by a nozzles Boric Acid solution 16 
g/l 
Temperature of sprayed materials, С Not more 90 
Design temperature, С 150 
Pressure drop in nozzle, MPa 0.1 
Flow rate of sprayed materials, m3/h 31 
Angle of tapered solid cone of spraying, degree 75 
Spraying dispersibility, mm 1.2 
Conditional flow capacity of supplying pipe branch, mm 50 
Conditional flow capacity of outlet pipe branch, mm 30 
17 
 
5.3.2. Description of hydrogen reduction system 
The containment hydrogen concentration monitoring system and the hydrogen removal system 
(named “XP” in FSAR [25]) are two components to control the concentration of hydrogen that 
may be released throughout the containment vessel atmosphere during a LOCA. Following the 
DBA, hydrogen gas may accumulate through the containment vessel from various sources. 
Whenever an adequate amount of hydrogen is generated, the reaction between the oxygen 
present in the containment vessel atmosphere and hydrogen produced may occur. Therefore, 
according to the consequences of LOCA, the indoor hydrogen concentrations in an Accident 
Localization Area (ALA) are preserved by the XP system according to flame-propagation 
limits of the parameters design range in the ALA rooms [25]. The components used in the 
emergency hydrogen removal system have been designed to operate successfully to maintain 
the maximum hydrogen concentration in the containment at or below 2%vol (volumetric) 
during LOCA and below 0.5%vol in the post-accident period. To avoid problems like 
nonuniform mixing, the former limit was selected as a reasonable limit [25]. The hydrogen 
monitoring system includes circumferential equipment to measure the volumetric hydrogen 
concentrations and to display and generate an alarm signal to the main control room (MCR) 
and emergency control room (ECR). Therefore, this emergency system shall be in function 
under all operating conditions, including the accident conditions [25]. One of the main 
components of the hydrogen removal system is the set of Passive Autocatalytic hydrogen 
Recombiners (PARs). PARs are located where the accumulation of hydrogen is possible [25]. 
A recombiner consists of: 
• catalyst unit, consisting of a set of catalyst rods installed in the unit frame; 
• frame (convective section with a protective shell); 
• eyes for securing to embedded parts. 
The XP system which is used in the Bushehr NPP consists of:   
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• a collection of 32 detectors which are used to ensure that the hydrogen concentration 
monitoring system fulfills its functions specified by the requirements; 
• a collection of 80 pieces of self-contained passive autocatalytic hydrogen recombiners 
that are used to ensure the emergency hydrogen disposal system fulfills the required 
functions. 
Generally, a PAR is composed of a unit of catalysts, comprising a set of catalytically active 
components, the convection section, equipped with a protective housing, and a cantilever to 
fasten it to the embedded part. The operation principle of PAR is based on the catalytic 
recombining reaction of hydrogen with oxygen on the catalytic surface. Platinum group metals 
are used as the catalyst. RVK-500 [25] type recombiner (TU 002 RVK RET-2004) is one of 
the most common types of recombiner, designed to comply with the requirements imposed by 
the design-basis accident occurrence, in full measure. The technical data of the device are listed 
in Table 7, whereas a schematic is represented in Figure 5. 
This component, which is installed in various parts of the containment, is simulated by the 
PARs (Passive Autocatalytic hydrogen Recombiners) model in the MELCOR code that is 
based on the Fischer model, which is a parametric one developed for the most common PAR 
design [29].  
Table 7. Characteristics of RVK-500 passive catalytic hydrogen recombiner [25] 
Characteristic Value 
Overall dimensions: 
- height, mm 
- dimension in plan, mm 
 
          950 5 
226  3345 
Mass, kg, not more than 25 
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Specific capacity for recombined hydrogen, kg/(m2s) 
(capacity related to the area of convective section of the 
shell at 0.2 MPa and 100 С): 
- when the volumetric concentration of H2 is 3 % 
- when the volumetric concentration of H2 is 5 % 
- when the volumetric concentration of H2 is 8 % 
 
 
 
           0.001 
           0.0022 
0.0046 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Passive autocatalytic hydrogen recombiner 
5.3.3. Simulation conditions 
During the simulations, some assumptions are considered. The initial pressure of containment 
is equal to atmospheric pressure (around 0.098 MPa). Temperatures in the cells located in the 
center of containment (cells 8, 9, 10 and 11) are selected as 600C [25], for other cells these 
equal 30 0C. Some other parameters of the initial conditions are given in Table 8. 
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Table 8. Initial conditions for DECL accident 
 
Parameter Value 
Initial power (MW) 3,120 
The design pressure inside the containment (MPa) 0.46 
Initial pressure in the primary system (MPa) 15.7 
Initial pressure in the secondary side (MPa) 7.0 
Located of rupture is in the reactor inlet Loop 4 
Located of rupture point Cell 3 
The spray system flow rate (kg/s) 83.33 
Number of high pressure injection coolant pumps(design) 1 
Number of low pressure injection coolant pumps(design) 1 
Period of spray system operation (s) 1800 
Water temperature in borated water storage tanks (oC)  60 
 
Pipeline break is assumed in cell number 3. Figure 6 and 7 show the profiles of mass and energy 
that are injected into cell 3 due to break, respectively. These data are used as code input in cell 
3. 
 
Figure 6. Profile of mass release from break [25] 
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Figure 7. Profile of energy release from break [25] 
Time steps of simulation codes (CONTAIN and MELCOR) are considered according to the 
priority of outputs details in the respective time range. Table 9 lists time steps that are used in 
codes in different time ranges. 
 
Table 9. Codes time steps in the different time ranges 
Accident Time Range (s) 0-25 25-200 200-50000 50000-3600000 
Time Step (s) 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.1 
 
 
Condensation process is activated in 23 cells by using “condense” instruction in CONTAIN 
code, the default value (ICOND=0) is also considered in MELCOR code that means 
condensation of water onto all aerosol particle is evaluated. 
6. Results and discussion 
Results of simulations related to thermal-hydraulic parameters in short time (0-200 seconds) 
and long time (0-105 seconds) are now presented. Effects of spray actuation are considered in 
short time. Hydrogen distribution and effects of PARs on its mitigation are also simulated in 
long time. 
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Pressurization of containment is almost a uniform process compared with temperature rising 
in different cells. Pressurization is affected more by adding of steam and water mass to the 
containment while temperature increases more by heat up (supply of energy) that is a slower 
process and depends on the components of each cell. Therefore, the pressure profile is almost 
similar in different cells. Figure 8 shows the average pressure profile in short time where it can 
be clearly noticed the effects of spray in reducing the average pressure. The peak pressure is 
about 0.4 MPa that is lower than 0.46 MPa as the maximum design pressure. It should be also 
noted that the maximum pressure with actuation of ESFs occurs after 20 s, showing the 
importance of the short time accident analysis. Long time average pressure profile is displayed 
in Figure 9, where the effectiveness of continuous working of spray and condensation of steam 
on spray drops in decreasing the pressure value can be perceived. 
 
Figure 8. Short term average pressure profile 
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Figure 9. Long term average pressure profile 
Results related to temperature and hydrogen distribution profiles are here shown for four 
representative cells (i.e. 3, 18, 22 and 23) out of the 23 in which the containment volume is 
divided (cells location and compartment can be found in Table 5). Figures 10 to 13 display the 
temperature profiles and the effect of spray for the selected cells in short time. In all of them, 
on the initial 20 seconds of the accident, the temperature rises suddenly up to its maximum 
point (spray has activated reaching its pressure set point after 5s). After a while, due to 
condensation of steam on spray droplets, the temperature decreases with a low slope 
demonstrating the reliability of the spray system in mitigating the consequences of this 
accident. Even though the plots are qualitatively similar, different temperature values are 
obtained for different cells because of their connections (inlet and outlet vents), location and 
heat structures. The results agree quite well with the FSAR data.  
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Figure 10. Short term temperature profile of cell 3 (SG compartment 2, bubbler, room of 
filters) 
 
Figure 11. Short term temperature profile of cell 18 (Staircases and adjoining rooms, 
chamber of the backup converter. Pumps of RCP oil cooling system, pipelines.) 
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Figure 12. Short term temperature profile of cell 22 (Reactor hall space between the 
cylindrical wall) 
 
Figure 13. Short term temperature profile of cell 23 (Reactor hall space above the cylindrical 
wall) 
 
For a better understanding of the hydrogen distribution, the profile of hydrogen mole fraction 
versus time for each of four selected cells in the long time is shown alongside its relevant 
temperature profile, both in the same figure. Each profile is plotted up to the time (reported on 
the abscissa) after which a steady-state behavior is recovered. These times are 105 and 3.6×105 
seconds (corresponding to 1000 hrs) for temperature and hydrogen mole fraction, respectively. 
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Figures 14 to 17 show the hydrogen distribution profiles, with and without recombiner 
actuation, and temperature profiles for cells 3, 18, 22 and 23, respectively. As the effects of 
recombiner on hydrogen distribution are almost the same for CONTAIN and MELCOR codes, 
only those computed with the latter are reported. In the initial times of accident, there is a low 
concentration of hydrogen inside the containment cells. As discussed before (Table 3), these 
amounts of hydrogen are due to the containment atmosphere in STP (Standard Temperature 
and Pressure) condition and radiolysis of water in the fuel pool. As breakage occurs, the 
spontaneous injection and flashing of the water and steam mixture into containment leads to 
an instantaneous increase of water and steam mole fraction in each cell and a coincident 
reduction of the hydrogen mole fraction. Along the progress of the accident, due to the creation 
of new hydrogen generation sources (such as steam-zirconium reaction) and spray actuation, 
the mole fraction of hydrogen increases. As PARs set points are around 1.5%vol, at this 
concentration PARs are activated. As it can be seen in these figures, using the PARs can prevent 
from rising the hydrogen concentration up to 2% that is flame propagation limit [25]. Results 
are in good agreement with the FSAR data (ANGAR code) showing the accuracy of the 
simulations. Discrepancies are due to different models and methods implemented into the three 
codes, ANGAR simulation method, number of heat structures and definition of code inputs. 
Although both CONTAIN and MELCOR codes solve conservation equations inside control 
volumes, their results are slightly dissimilar as their computational assumptions are not exactly 
the same, being the differences related to the number of conservation equations employed to 
the model coolant, liquid phase treatment models, number of enclosures, and number of the 
flowpaths between enclosures. 
Finally, the hydrogen mole fraction (without recombiner actuation) and thermal-hydraulic 
distribution maps are presented in Figure 18 for the last seconds of long time accident (about 
105 seconds). Cell 20 has the maximum mole fraction in the long-term, about 9.3% in the 
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absence of PARs, whereas the maximum amount of hydrogen is found in cell 22 (not reported 
in the figure). By activating the PARs at their set point (1.5%vol), as seen in Figure 14 to 17, 
the concentration drops below the flame propagation limit. 
 
Figure 14. Hydrogen distribution profile in cell 3 
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Figure 15. Hydrogen distribution profile in cell 18 
 
Figure 16. Hydrogen distribution profile in cell 22 
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Figure 17. Hydrogen distribution profile in cell 23. 
 Conclusion 
Monitoring the hydrogen concentration inside the containment is one of the main safety 
measurements in the case of BDBA and severe accident. Hydrogen accumulation and its 
explosion inside the containment can put the integrity of containment in danger and eventually 
lead to the release of radioactive material to the environment.  
In this paper, distribution of hydrogen due to the in-vessel severe accident has been simulated 
by using CONTAIN 2.0 and MELCOR 1.8.6 codes. Thermal-hydraulic parameters of 
containment (temperature and pressure), spray effects on these parameters, the mole fraction 
of hydrogen and PARs effects on mitigation of hydrogen concentration have been simulated in 
short and long times and compared with those reported on the FSAR (ANGAR code). The 
outcomes show that: 
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• in the presence of ESFs, the pressure and temperature peaks occur in the initial seconds 
of this type of accidents. Therefore, actuation of some ESFs (like spray) in the initial 
seconds of the event can keep the thermal-hydraulic parameters below their maximum 
design value, playing a vital role in decreasing the accident consequences and avoiding 
the disintegration of containment.  
• Recombiners as a type of ESF can reduce the hydrogen concentration below the flame 
propagation critical limit in the accidents where hydrogen generation takes place. Their 
efficiency depended on their specifications, their number and locations inside the 
containment that show the importance of the knowledge of hydrogen distribution 
during the accident. This knowledge can help the engineers to correctly locate the 
recombiner units within the power plant layout. 
• MELCOR, CONTAIN and ANGAR [25] codes relate to the class of multi-parametric 
codes with lumped parameters and are designed for numerically analyzing the 
development of accident in NPP containments. The observed discrepancies are because 
of the different models, numerical methods, solution algorithm, properties library and 
different assumptions that these codes are using in their simulations.  
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Figure 18. Hydrogen and thermal-hydraulic distribution map in last second of accident (about 
105 seconds) 
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Figure Captions: 
Figure 1. BNPP containment structure 
Figure 2. Hydrogen generation profile 
Figure 3. Cells layout diagram and connections 
Figure 4. Spray cycle in BNPP 
Figure 5. Passive autocatalytic hydrogen recombiner 
Figure 6. Profile of mass release from break [25] 
Figure 7. Profile of energy release from break [25] 
Figure 8. Short term average pressure profile 
Figure 9. Long term average pressure profile 
Figure 10. Short term temperature profile of cell 3 (SG compartment 2, bubbler, room of filters) 
Figure 11. Short term temperature profile of cell 18 (Staircases and adjoining rooms, chamber 
of the backup converter. Pumps of RCP oil cooling system, pipelines.) 
Figure 12. Short term temperature profile of cell 22 (Reactor hall space between the cylindrical 
wall) 
Figure 13. Short term temperature profile of cell 23 (Reactor hall space above the cylindrical 
wall) 
Figure 14. Hydrogen distribution profile in cell 3 
Figure 15. Hydrogen distribution profile in cell 18 
Figure 16. Hydrogen distribution profile in cell 22 
Figure 17. Hydrogen distribution profile in cell 23 
Figure 18. Hydrogen and thermal-hydraulic distribution map in last second of the accident 
(about 105 seconds) 
 
 
 
 
